**Notes on Revision**

Thank you for the very helpful suggestions! I totally agree that the paper is not cohesive enough, and the new version tries to address this.

I also agree that the second worry relied on a tendentious reading of Luzon, and I have removed it. I do still talk about arguments from the notion of a good guide, but hopefully in a more theoretically neutral way.

The biggest change is that I’ve tried to clarify exactly what’s going on in the first worry. The initial draft suggested the following argument, which I think the report didn’t think was very good, and I should have been clearer that I wasn’t committed to it:

1. AT fails for Cartesian certainty.
2. So, by analogy, AT fails for states like rationality.

That’s no good because there are so many disanalogies, as the report points out. Instead, what I want to argue is this:

1. AT fails for Cartesian certainty.
2. So, any argument that AT is true for rationality better rely on some respect in which rationality is not like Cartesian certainty. Otherwise, the argument overgenerates.

So the point is not to directly argue against AT, but to argue that there isn’t a good argument for it. The problem here is that it’s really easy to slip into the following reasoning: If AT holds for rationality, my preferred position is false, so any argument for AT is question-begging. Of course that would be absurd; it would rule out any argument. So instead I go back to why people have been tempted to the anti-enkrasia position, and argue that given the reasons they’ve had for this temptation, we should think the argument does in fact overgenerate.

In the course of setting this out more clearly, I noticed something else that was puzzling in Luzon’s paper. One of the targets of the paper, I think the person named most frequently as a target, is Williamson. But Williamson agrees with the anti-akrasa position as Luzon states it. Now I don’t think Luzon is wrong to target Williamson, since he does endorse some very similar anti-enkratic principles. But it was helpful to set out just what Williamson is and is not agreeing with, because I think a distinct argument Luzon gives, the argument from self-defeat, could be a good argument for exactly the position Williamson ends up with. That’s the point of section 5 of the new paper.

Finally, I did leave in the stuff about formal models, but I put a bit more work into saying why they are relevant. There have been a few different suggestions about why Williamson’s models don’t have the anti-enkratic implications he thinks they do. The model I built accounts for 3 out of the 4 suggestions - to be fair, I don’t have a good response to the fourth. So the complaint isn’t just that Luzon should have said more about why these models aren’t a problem for AT (though actually that might have been a good idea), but that most of the existing responses to the models won’t help rescue AT. It’s also, I think, a somewhat interesting model in its own right. When I first read Williamson’s work I thought that there would be positions that gave up S5 but avoided his results; I now think that unless you give up conditionalisation, you’ll still end up with the same results.